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A History of  Financial Aid to Students
By Matthew B. Fuller
Colleges, universities, and the communities they serve have always
been concerned about students’ abilities to pay and the systems of aid
to support students’ learning. This article reviews the history of
aiding student in higher education. Early student- and institution-
ally-led programs are discussed along with initial philanthropic and
charitable efforts. The author argues that the nature of financial aid
has shifted from a locally-drive philanthropic effort, to a complex
federal system, and, finally, to a system focused on political discourse.
After describing this shift, the author discusses implications for the
stability of financial aid and higher education in America.
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The National Center for Educational Statistics (2012) estimated thatfifty-five percent (11.5 million students) of  college and vocationalprogram students received some form of  financial aid in 2010. This
percentage increased when accounting for college or university students
only; seventy-four percent of  college and university students received some
form of  financial aid in 2010 (NCES, 2012). Financial aid has become a
fundamental expectation of  students and institutions. The history of  how
America’s system of  financial aid developed to a point where nearly three-
quarters of  college or university students take financial aid warrants further
consideration of  scholars and practitioners in the field.
This manuscript analyzes several primary and secondary sources to
provide a broad overview of  the long and storied history of  how societies
provided aid to higher education students. Furthermore, it describes and
analyzes how a variety of  historical episodes demonstrate the manner in
which aid evolved as a result of  higher education and societal develop-
ments, and signals the emergence of  a political agenda-based philosophy of
student aid. Reviewing these historical episodes reveals that student financial
aid has evolved from local, mostly philanthropic efforts, to a nationwide
system of  aid, interconnected and responsive to changes in American
higher education and society. Traditional scholarship has focused on
applications and debates between need-based and merit-based philosophies
of  financial aid. This manuscript reviews historical evidence to discuss a
shift from local, philanthropic efforts to government control and outlines
how contemporary financial aid is increasingly driven by political priorities
rather than student need or merit.
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These analyses better situate financial aid practitioners in understanding
their profession and calling upon history to reflect upon current financial
aid polices and philosophies. The manuscript is written in a loose chrono-
logical order. The complexities of  financial aid do not allow for a perfect
chronology of  events since several movements within and outside of
financial aid and higher education evolved simultaneously or separately.
Wherever possible, primary sources of  historical evidence were used in the
research and writing of  this document. Contemporary popular press and
legislative sources served not as definitive scholarly evidence, but to depict
the historic contexts of financial aid and social discourse in America.
Despite efforts to present an exhaustive review of  the history of  financial
aid, it would be nearly impossible to cover the entire topic in full detail.
The financial aid of  each period of  higher education is a subject of  its
own, worthy of  further review by scholars and practitioners desiring a
more clear understanding of the foundations of financial aid.
Nonetheless, if  one traces the historical evidence of  financial aid, one
finds a unique story that speaks to the manner in which institutions,
students, policy-makers, and society inter-relate and respond to the con-
texts of  their day. One also finds a complex, evolving system of  philan-
thropic programs, scholarships, grants, and loans aimed at supporting the
educational pursuits of  students. Throughout its history, financial aid has
had a tremendous influence on institutional quality, accreditation, enroll-
ment, admissions, teaching, research, physical infrastructure, and institu-
tional policies, to name a few. Viewing financial aid’s history allows scholars
and practitioners to understand how institutions and policy makers have
responded to external pressures, how they have advocated for student
access to education, and how society has sought and achieved the goals it
espouses for an educated citizenry. Like much of  America’s higher educa-
tion history, one must first consider the religious foundations of  patronage
and philanthropy in medieval European universities to understand the
foundations of  financial aid in the U.S.
Understanding how professors were paid offers key considerations in
understanding student financial aid systems in medieval universities. Three
sources of  financial support were generally recognized in these early
institutions: student-paid, church-paid, and crown- or state-paid (Thelin,
2011; Wilkinson, 2005). For example, at the oldest, continually running
university to grant degrees throughout its entire history—the University of
Bologna—students directly hired professors for their services. How
students raised the necessary capital to pay for these services was usually a
function of  family income. However, student financial needs also led to a
unique system of  pooling financial resources. In the 1100s, the University
of  Bologna was a mecca for intellectual and cultural life and students came
from across Europe to study with preeminent scholars (Long, 1994).
Bolognese professors were not organized into a university in the modern
sense of  the term. Instead, each professor operated more or less as a
freelance instructor, offering courses of  his own design and charging
whatever fees students were willing to pay. If  a professor offered anti-
quated, irrelevant classes or was a poor, abusive, or belittling instructor,
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them. Professors only got paid if  students found their courses worth
taking and if  they limited the cost of  their courses. This system not only
ensured professors offered relevant, well-taught, and supportive classes, it
led to an institutional economy driven by the proverbial invisble hand of
competition (Long, 1994).
 As Bologna became crowded with foreign students and local citizens,
professors imposed rules aimed at drawing down the number of  foreign
students (Long, 1994). Under this system, foreign students were held
responsible for the debts of  fellow countrymen. For example, if  an
English student owed money to a Bolognese citizen or faculty member but
left before paying that debt, other English students were made to pay the
original debt. As a result, foreign students banded together into an associa-
tion referred to as a nation with all English students comprising one nation,
all French students comprising another, and so forth (Long, 1994). As
situations arose where a student needed assistance paying off  a financial
debt, members of  the nation supported the need through pooled resources
kept in loan chests by senior students. Eventually, these nations pooled
resources to support student debts and needs related to schooling, sup-
porting those who could not afford a full course of  study. These early
practices were, thus, need-based and were the root of  an ethos of  aiding
students in educational pursuits.
The pattern of  aiding poor clerks—students of  theology bound for
ministerial life—was well established in England by the Thirteenth Century
(Wilkinson, 2005). However, the types of  aid to poor students “varied,
from free places given in return for doing college chores to access to
kitchen leftovers to a license to beg like a mendicant priest” (Wilkinson,
2005, p. 65). Poor students were frequently made to work their way
through college, often through apprenticeships, labor positions, or as
servants to professors (Cobban, 2002). However, efforts the modern
student would recognize as scholarships were also employed. On the whole,
these scholarships were not usually awarded through competition or on
basis of  merit or need, but as gifts between wealthy families, excluding the
neediest of  students (Sears, 1922). However, Wilkinson (2005) noted that
“the starting point [of  an ethic of  aid to students] was Jesus’ care of  the
poor and afflicted, linked to the idea of  supporting pious learning” (p. 65).
Those families that could afford to do so found it pious and comforting to
assist in the educational pursuits of  poor students. Thus, from its earliest
days, student aid included the notion that enterprising students—especially
poor students—ought to be able to improve their situation in society and
patronage of  this effort was good and virtuous. This overarching ethos of
patronage and charity in medieval Europe was the root of  charitable colleges
and charitable chaplains (Rubin, 1987). Wealthy benefactors would give
monetary scholarships to poorer students in exchange for acts of  mercy or
penance. For example, in 1257, the executors of  William Kilkenny, the late
bishop of  Ely, gave 200 marks to support two students of  theology at
Cambridge University who were to pray for Kilkenny’s soul and do good
deeds in his name (Clark, 1897). Similar endowments were left to various
colleges and priories associated with Cambridge and Oxford (Cobban,
2002).
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These religious foundations of  patronage shaped the way colleges,
universities, faculty, and administrators operated for centuries to come.
Early accounts by senior faculty at medieval institutions recounted the
extensive work they did in securing funds from external supporters for
institutional needs and student support (Cobban, 2002; Rubin, 1987).
Universities, colleges, buildings, and programs were named in honor of
donors and fueled philanthropic giving as a sign of  wealth and piety among
wealthy families (Wilkinson, 2005). Aid to poor students also resulted in
differentiated services (i.e. lower-cost housing and dining facilities for poor
students; higher-cost facilities for wealthy students) and dictated how
curricula and programs were specialized according to socio-economic
status (Wilkinson, 2005). Before the American colonies were established, a
system of  aid to students was well underway in Europe, providing a general
pattern for American colonial colleges.
The American system of  higher education continued the tradition of
sponsorship, charity, and patronage established by European universities. It
was not until 1639, with the passing of  Charlestown, MA minister John
Harvard—who left New College his entire library and half  of  his wealth,
or £780—that New College had sufficient means to hire faculty, erect
buildings, and attract students. New College was rechristened as Harvard
College in 1639 and Newtown was renamed Cambridge, after the English
university John Harvard attended (Cobban, 2002).
Wealthy colonists played important philanthropic roles in sponsorship
and patronage of  grade schools and institutions of  higher learning in the
Colonies. Acts such as the Old Field School Laws established an
overarching ethos of  charity and support of  schools as the standard way
of  life among wealthy colonists (Urban & Wagoner, 2008). While such laws
and acts did not establish federal or state support of  individual students,
they did contribute to the general sense that supporting students in their
educational pursuits was proper and advanced the vitality of  the Colonies.
Cast in this context, wealthy patrons established endowed scholarships
for students. By 1643, Harvard had received funds for its first endowed
scholarship from Lady Anne Radcliffe Mowlson, who stipulated that
interest on her donation of £100 be used to aid poor students’ pursuit of
education (Mowlson, 1643). Following Lady Mowlson’s example, a host of
Colonial elites made collegiate giving their primary philanthropic pursuit.
As with many ideas in higher education, the concept of  the philanthropic
scholarship spread like wildfire from Cambridge. Scholarships were
established by early benefactors at William and Mary, Yale, Princeton, and
the University of  Pennsylvania (Thelin, 2011).
During the Revolutionary War, colonists’ philanthropic efforts were
diverted from student aid toward military efforts. The general pattern of
scholarships was well established before the United States of  America even
existed, and, as in England, was usually a matter of  gifting between elite
families (Wilkinson, 2005). Wilkinson noted that “the American Revolution
did not revolutionize student aid” (p. 69). However, the Revolution did
influence patterns of  student lending in two indirect ways. First, the
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colleges operating west of  the former colonial territories (Wilkinson,
2005). To fund this expansion, colleges had to maintain reasonable costs
and at least some form of  charity or tuition aid to attract students. Second,
the Revolution discredited hereditary privilege and aristocratic exclusive-
ness (Wilkinson, 2005). Instead, the new country’s citizens favored a
commitment to the idea of  “an educated citizenry” (Wilkinson, 2005, p.
70) and believed supporting students’ educational needs would reap
societal benefits. As Wilkinson (2005) noted, “scholarship aid [following
the American Revolution] was at least as important symbolically, aligning
colleges with republican, antiaristocratic virtue, as for anything it did
materially for students” (p. 70).
Transformation of  the American way of  life was unbridled from the
American Revolution through the conclusion of  the War of  1812. Numer-
ous changes in social, cultural, and industrial archetypes occurred, provid-
ing new pressures on higher education. In much the same way that the
Revolution expanded higher education westward, so did the Louisiana
Purchase of  1803 press the need for funds to support collegiate expansion.
Financial aid efforts were critical in this funding effort (Wilkinson, 2005).
However, financial support of  institutions was generally still a matter of
philanthropic support from wealthy citizens devoted to supporting student
needs (Thelin, 2011). While scholarships were prevalent, a cogent, centrally
coordinated system of financial aid and a system to measure student merit
had yet to develop. As such, a student’s financial history remained the
primary means of  assessing their need for financial aid. Harvard was the
first to develop a new system of  financial aid that quickly advanced
throughout the nation’s institutions and eventually into the federal govern-
ment.
In 1838, Harvard established a private student lending agency respon-
sible for making zero-interest loans to students who could otherwise not
afford to attend. The program, known commonly as the Harvard Loan
Program, was a part of  Harvard’s General Beneficiary Fund raised by
wealthy alumni and benefactors. Students seeking support through the loan
fund had to make their petition for such support to the university presi-
dent by the first day of  classes, stating what forms of  aid they already had
or were expecting to receive from the University and, if  under twenty-one
years of  age, provide a written approval for taking out the loan from their
parents (Harvard University, 1874). Support of  “young men of  ability to
[earn] an education, when their families are not able to help them, seems a
peculiarly judicious and useful charity…” (Harvard University, 1874, p. 13).
Similar loan programs spread from Harvard University to other Ivy League
and state colleges in the mid- to late-1800s (Cohen & Kisker, 2009; Thelin,
2011).
Financial Aid
in the New and
Industrializing
Nation
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The period from 1870 to 1945 was characterized by transformations in
campus buildings and layouts, enrollment in higher education, and finance
of  educational endeavors (Cohen & Kisker, 2009). In 1870, approximately
63,000 students were enrolled at 250 institutions of  higher education in
America. By 1945, nearly 1.7 million students crowded into 1,768 colleges
and universities (Synder, 1993). During this period, academic disciplines
were also developing and focusing on new purposes for educating stu-
dents. Industrialization in this period heightened the need for men skilled
in scientific approaches to agriculture, military sciences, psychology,
business, and education (Cohen & Kisker, 2009). This period also saw the
professionalization of  many disciplines such as psychology, chemistry,
engineering, law, medicine, and education (Menand, 2001). Professional
organizations and, in higher education, accreditation agencies, were
founded and focused on admissions standards and criteria to determine
who should be allowed to practice in the disciplines. Many professional
agencies lacked a way to determine which students were intelligent enough
to warrant education in U.S. universities and colleges. Drawing from
experiences in military testing, psychology offered a solution that would
eventually form the foundation for scholarship and admissions exams in
American higher education.
Much has been said and written about the development of  the field of
psychological testing through U.S. Army intelligence testing and sorting
programs (DuBois, 1970; Giardano, 2005; Gould, 1996; Gregory, 2004;
Lemann, 2000). However, testing also holds importance in the history of
financial aid as the nation’s oldest admissions test, the Scholastic Aptitude
Test, was first administered to identify the brightest entering students for
scholarships (Lemann, 2000). In 1933, James Bryant Conant became the
President of  Harvard and almost immediately began a new scholarship
program for academically gifted boys. He delegated Henry Chauncey, then
an assistant dean at Harvard, the task of  finding or creating an exam that
could rank candidates’ skills so that the most gifted students received these
scholarships. Chauncey had served as an Army test administrator and had
met one of  the leading psychological measurement minds of  his time, Carl
Brigham, developer of  the Army Mental Tests (Lemann, 2000). In 1934,
Chauncey answered Conant’s call and, together with Brigham, took a
modified version of  the Army Alpha Test and the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(S.A.T.) to Conant as a method to select the brightest scholarship appli-
cants at Harvard based upon the students’ merits. In 1938, Chauncey
convinced the College Board to offer the S.A.T. as a standardized exam for
the purpose of  identifying the brightest students for scholarships. By 1941,
the S.A.T. was administered to all incoming Harvard students as a require-
ment of  admission. By 1944, all Ivy League schools and many prestigious
public institutions required minimum S.A.T. scores for admission and
scholarship awards (Lemann, 2000, p. 8-9). With the development of
admissions and scholarship examinations, measuring a student’s abilities
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Concurrent with developing scholarship and loan systems, a system of
military pensions was developing that influenced student financial aid by
entrenching an ethos of  governmental provision for individuals. Eventually
this sense of  provision set the stage for the government to play an in-
creased role in providing financial assistance for soldiers’ and citizens’
higher education pursuits. Military pensions had been a part of  America’s
history since the Revolutionary period. Even before George Washington
was able to assemble and train American military men, Congress enacted
the first American pension system to entice colonists to take up arms.
However, early financial troubles resulted in the denial of  many Revolu-
tionary War and War of  1812 pension applications (Clark, Craig, & Wilson,
2003; Veterans’ Administration, 1821). By the close of  the Civil War,
however, the pattern for military pensions was relatively set and stable with
injured veterans, widows, and honorably discharged servicemen being
eligible for long-term financial support.
Governmental pension plans for military men and their widows did
more than pay soldiers for service to the country. They established a
general sense that the government should, to a growing extent, provide for
the financial well-being of  its citizens, particularly its veterans. Nonethe-
less, government military pension programs have never been perfect.
Protests over unpaid benefits have followed every American War, the most
notable being the Bonus Expeditionary Force or Bonus Marchers from
World War I. In the spring and summer of  1932, an estimated 43,000
marchers—World War I veterans and their families—occupied Washing-
ton, D.C. to protest the government’s empty promises from the Bonus Act
of  1924. Ultimately, military men and tanks under the command of
Douglas MacArthur were mobilized to remove the veteran marchers and
burn their camps, killing two protesting veterans. Many, including Franklin
Roosevelt, criticized the fact that American troops were deployed against
American veterans exercising their right to protest and assembly. This
sentiment proved too steep for President Hoover to overcome and he lost
reelection to Roosevelt in 1932.
Having seen the damage wrought upon the government by the events of
1932, President Roosevelt wanted to avoid a second Bonus March (Humes,
2006). Reliable access and expectations of  pensions provided a direct
motive for passing the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of  1944. The fact
that servicemen were willing to march on the nation’s capital to demand
their pension payments indicates that pensions evolved from an individual
benefit to collective entitlement by the start of  the Second World War.
First with veterans, and later with civilian citizens, the growing sense of
financial support and entitlement would provide the foundation for
financial aid in higher education that opened the campus gates and trans-
formed American higher education forever.
That the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of  1944, more commonly known
as the G.I. Bill, was a transformative watershed moment in the history of
higher education is an understatement. In the span of one decade after its
implementation (1944 to 1954), enrollment in American higher education
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1993). The G.I. Bill positioned the federal government in the critical roles
of financier and coordinator of higher education for millions of Ameri-
cans. Perhaps the greatest irony of  the G.I. Bill is that even though it made
direct cash grant payments to veterans pursuing higher education, its
housing loan program served as a more apt pattern for future student loan
programs.
With images of  the botched Bonus Act of  1924 on their minds, the
Senate and House drafted a non-bonus-based bill that allowed servicemen
to choose what and when to use three major benefits: (a) unemployment
benefits; (b) low-interest rate, no down payment housing loans; and (c)
stipends to support continued education and training. However, the Senate,
House, and President Roosevelt disagreed on various employment and
health care provisions discussed early in the Bill’s creation. Part of  the
contention over employment was statistics for expected educational
enrollment and homeownership were presented definitively as undesirable
to most servicemen (Humes, 2006). In three different surveys between
1943 and 1945, the War Department sampled a cross-section of  service-
men and determined that between seven and eight percent of  servicemen
planned to capitalize on the education benefits being considered (Army
Service Forces, 1944; Olson, 1973). Policy makers and advisers also
assumed most veterans would return to their previous place of  residence
and settle in apartment complexes in urban employment centers, making
housing benefits moot. While education and housing benefits were pre-
sumed to be non-issues, the debate over guaranteed employment set the
stage for a political battle that threatened the passage of  the G.I. Bill
altogether (Olson, 1973). Post-War America simply did not have enough
jobs for millions of  returning veterans.
Armed with survey data and stoked by heated debates in Congress, the
government expected results. Instead, it got consequences. Before the war,
college and homeownership were unattainable American Dreams and
fewer than half  of  the Pre-World War II servicemen had even graduated
from high school (Army Service Forces, 1944; Synder, 1993). By 1947,
veterans accounted for half  of  the college admissions in America (U.S.
Department of  Veterans’ Affairs, 2012). Between 1944 and 1952, the
Department of  Veterans Affairs had lent money on over 2.4 million
guaranteed, no-interest home loans to veterans. Ironically, few veterans
sought the employment provisions laid out in the Bill and less than 20% of
the funds set aside for that program were used (United States Department
of  Veterans’ Affairs, 2012). In contrast, by the end of  the programs in
1956, 2.2 million servicemen had capitalized on the educational benefits
offered by the Bill (Army Service Forces, 1944). The Depression era-boys
that went to War against the Axis came out as family men, homeowners,
and college graduates thanks to the massive federal investment in their
future (Humes, 2006).
The G.I. Bill had three direct effects on the nature of  financial aid in the
United States. First, it formally established the now-familiar structure of
federal student support of  servicemen, which later provided a precedent
for federal and private aid to non-enlisted citizens. In regards to student
lending, the G.I. Bill established low-interest, no down payment housing
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loans, a precedent for low-interest student loans of  latter decades. The G.I.
Bill also cemented the federal government’s role as co-signer on housing
loans with veterans, fashioning the now-familiar guaranteed loan program
associated with federal student loans. On a deeper level, the G.I. Bill
solidified an approach to supporting higher education through students,
rather than directly to institutions. This philosophy would direct most
federal lending toward educational needs for the next two decades.
Second, the G.I. Bill established the policy of  connecting institutional
quality to financial support through professional self-regulation and
accreditation. When the Bill was reauthorized in 1952 in preparation for
returning Korean Conflict veterans, the federal government provided
educational benefits only to veterans applying to high quality, accredited
institutions.
Finally, the Bill transformed the nature and structure of  higher educa-
tion. Virtually overnight, institutions had to accommodate many more
students from social classes that had previously been excluded from higher
education. The G.I. Bill provided impetus for the professionalization of
the student financial aid administrator’s role. Institutions needed trained
administrative professionals to manage the revenues and bureaucracy of
the massive federal investment in higher education. America also needed a
means of  sorting the mass of  students into appropriate programs and
institutions. Scholarship and admissions exams stood ready to suit this
need. As Cohen and Kisker (2009) noted, virtually every aspect of  higher
education was fundamentally transformed by the G.I. Bill.
Following the establishment of  the G.I. Bill in 1944, the story of  financial
aid in the United States is mainly one of  exponential growth in student
enrollment and unprecedented fiscal investments in higher education. In
addition to this tremendous growth, the transformative period following
the Second World War also ushered in new discourses in quality and access
to higher education through the federal government’s investment in higher
education. In each decade since the establishment of  the G.I. Bill, the U.S.
government produced commission reports, Acts, or mandates questioning
the government’s financial support of  citizens’ education. In many re-
spects, the post-G.I. Bill history of  financial aid is a story of  growing
societal discord with the cost and quality of a system of higher education
thought by many to be on the government dole (Wilkinson, 2005).
The Higher Education for American Democracy Report and Senate
Special Committee Investigation of  National Defense Program (a.k.a. The
Truman Commission Report) were two prominent reports that questioned
the return on the government’s investment in higher education and con-
cerns of  private profiteering, respectively. Both reports relied on site visits
to highlight issues in educational and military organizations. Among many
sweeping recommendations, the Truman Commission Report called for
federal and nation-wide support of  “scholarships, fellowships, and general
aid” (Zook, 1947, p. 33) that were equitably distributed across the states
and different racial subgroups. However, the Truman Commission Report
did not offer or authorize specific frameworks for accomplishing this
Post-G.I. Bill
Developments
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coordinated effort. Instead, it focused on the needs of  racial minorities
and poor students to obtain access to higher education.
Following the Trumann Commission’s example, the Senate established a
Special Committee on Labor and Public Welfare with a Select Committee
to Investigate Educational, Training, and Loan Guaranty Programs under
the G.I. Bill (U.S. Congress, 1951). This Select Committee sent investiga-
tors out to institutions across the United States in much the same way the
Truman Commission Report did. Between 1950 and 1952, Select Commit-
tee investigators uncovered 258 institutions with problems, chief  among
these being apparent flaws in institutional quality, an inability to teach
students anything of  significance, and perhaps most egregiously, in the
eyes of  investigators, overcharging of  students on federal aid (U.S. Con-
gress, 1951, Appendix D). This Special Committee Report was the first of
many arguing that federal lending and aid to students was increasing
college costs as campus leaders realized the untapped potential of  re-
sources available through federal aid.
To counter this argument, the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of
19521, a reauthorization of  the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of  1944,
offered a nuanced pattern for federal aid to Korean War Veterans. Rather
than pay benefits directly to students enrolling at any institution as the
original G.I. Bill did, the 1952 reauthorization provided educational
benefits to students enrolling only at institutions that met specific quality
criteria. Eligibility for federal educational assistance for veterans was
limited to students enrolling in institutions accredited by an organization
recognized by the U.S. Secretary of  Education (Thelin, 2011). Rather than
establish a federal ministry of  education for higher education institutions,
the 1952 Act established the federal government’s reliance on accreditation
agencies to determine quality. In doing so, the federal government estab-
lished the current system of  access to federal funds through self-gover-
nance and peer review while also balancing its distance from higher
education oversight.
Similar provisions about institutional quality and access to federal funds
through student intermediaries were outlined in the National Defense
Education Act of  1958 [NDEA], an Act that invested $575 million in
accredited higher education institutions (Archibald, 2002; Cohen & Kisker,
2009). The NDEA also established the National Defense Student Loan
System, later named the National Direct Loan System and, eventually, the
Perkins Loan program. These loans were made directly from the federal
government to civilian and military graduate and undergraduate students in
areas supporting national defense on a basis of  financial need. Fleming
(1960), however, noted many of  the loans were awarded to students in
military sciences, engineering, science, math, and education regardless of
student financial need. As a revolving loan program, states were obligated
to deposit $405 million into loan accounts over the course of  the program,
allowing future students to benefit after the NDEA concluded. Individu-
ally, these loans ranged from approximately $1,000 to $5,000 and were to
be repaid after graduation through a ten-year term and with a 3% interest
rate.
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The National Defense Student Loan System also formalized a loan
forgiveness clause, the first of  its kind for federal aid. To support growth
in education jobs, pre-service teaching students received a 15% reduction
in their loan payments for each year that they taught in a school. As one of
the early major federal attempts to lend civilians dollars for school atten-
dance, the National Defense Student Loan System was successful in
opening the doors of higher education for many students previously
unable to attend college. In 1940, roughly 500,000 college-aged students—
or 15% of  their age group—attended college. Thanks to the G.I. Bill and
later the NDEA and its Loan System, the percentage of  college-aged
students attending college in 1960 had swelled to 30% or four million
enrolled students (Fleming, 1960; Synder, 1993). The NDEA also marked
the beginning of  the federal government’s role in shaping the kinds of
students entering and graduating from colleges and universities, thus,
signaling the emergence of  a priority- or agenda-based philosophy of  aid
to students aimed at ensuring economic vitality and national security
through financial aid policy.
Developments in the private sector also refined the U.S. system of
student aid following the enactment of  the G.I. Bill. In 1954, the College
Board’s College Scholarship Service opened with the aim of  providing low
income and minority students with funds to pursue higher education
(College Board, 2012). Applicants with financial need could complete a
profile form and staff  at the College Scholarship Service would play
match-maker by providing information to colleges looking for such
candidates. This approach has been considered a precursor to the present
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), the primary means of
measuring student financial need. The College Scholarship Service was also
an early attempt to expand student aid to new sectors of  society, namely,
low-income and minority students. Nonetheless, societal attitudes had
shifted and questions over access and affordability for a wider array of
students were common political discourses by the 1950s and 1960s
(Wilkinson, 2005). Political discourses about national security, Commu-
nism, and economic vitality coupled with discourses on the new role of the
government in student lending and the government began a focus on using
financial aid policy to advance political agendas.
The College Scholarship Service also encouraged the creation of  coopera-
tive relationships between institutions to aid in identifying the widest array
of  students in need of  financial assistance. Wilkinson (2005) noted that by
the mid-1970s at least 150 institutions were participating in twenty-four
collaborative groups supported by the College Scholarship Service. The
extent of  the collaborations ranged from setting common financial aid
policies to setting equal prices for financial aid offers to students
(Wilkinson, 2005). The most enduring of  such groups was The Overlap
Group formed in 1958 by agreements between nine Ivy League and four-
teen other private and public institutions (Wilkinson, 2005). The group’s
purpose was to limit the number of  need-based scholarships offered
among partnering institutions and “neutralize the effect of  financial aid so
that a student may choose among Ivy Group institutions for non-financial
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representatives on the Overlap Group met annually to set the prices of
tuition and fees for students admitted to multiple institutions. The Ivy
League institutions saw this effort as a means of  distributing scholarship
dollars among the greatest number of  needy students by ensuring that no
one institution would offer more money to students with the highest test
scores. For three decades, the Overlap Group set prices for mutually-
accepted students (Browning, 1992; Kreisler, 1991; Matlock, 1994).
The 1980s saw eroding public sentiment for rising college costs. Begin-
ning in 1989, the Justice Department began investigating financial aid
practices of  Overlap Group institutions and, in 1991, filed a complaint
alleging the institutions colluded in fixing tuition prices, a violation of  the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Justice Department filed their complaint
against the nine Ivy League institutions. The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the
Third Circuit ultimately found that an anti-trust violation had indeed
occurred. The court’s reasoning was founded upon the belief  that the
Overlap Group’s efforts to set prices at standard rates across all institu-
tions eliminated price competition for outstanding needy students, allowing
Overlap Group institutions to set whatever tuition and fee prices they
wanted.
Eight of  the nine institutions involved in the Overlap Group reached a
pre-trial settlement wherein they would not meet to set prices of  tuition or
discuss financial aid of  mutually-admitted students (Browning, 1992).
However, the Massachusetts Institute of  Technology refused to settle and,
thus, faced a ten-day court hearing, which they ultimately lost. As a result
of  this case, institutions would be allowed to share limited financial
information but would not be allowed to set prices for mutually-admitted
students or engage in other actions that effectively eliminated price compe-
tition.
The Overlap Group ceased to meet in 1991 and the practice of  setting
standardized tuition and fee costs through similar groups discontinued
shortly thereafter. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush signed a reautho-
rization of  a longstanding Act, allowing a two-year window for institutions
to establish information sharing consortia that would discuss student
financial aid on the basis of  documented financial need only. Institutions
were not authorized to adjust prices based upon these discussions and
could not discuss individual students’ cases. The bill President Bush
reauthorized was not even in existence in 1958 when the Overlap Group
was formed. It has, however, been the most far-reaching piece of  legisla-
tion guiding contemporary American higher education and student finan-
cial aid: The Higher Education Act of  1965.
The Higher Education Act of  1965 was a highlight in President Lyndon
Johnson’s legislative accomplishments and stands out as one of  the seminal
moments in American higher education history (Cohen & Kisker, 2009;
Thelin, 2011). The Act cemented the federal government’s involvement in
higher education and permanently established a philosophy of  higher
education as an issue of  national interest. The Higher Education Act also
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programs in higher education, while also requiring institutions accepting
Title IV funds through students to adhere to recognized accreditation
standards and report data on institutional quality and operations. Title IV
of  the Higher Education Act of  1965 provided for a guaranteed loan
program by backing the loans between student and private lenders with the
full faith of  the federal government. Under early direct loan programs,
students borrowing money were doing so by borrowing U.S. Treasury
funds. In contrast, the 1965 act established a guaranteed loan program that
carried with it the full promise of  the U.S. government to repay private
lenders if a student defaulted on their loan (Zumeta, 2001).
In the 1972 re-authorization of  the Act, the institution-based philosophy
of  supporting higher education was critically challenged and the student-
based intermediary model of  lending became prevalent. The 1972 reauthoriza-
tion established the Educational Opportunity Grants designed to support
access to higher education to students with the greatest financial need, and
the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, later known as the Stafford Loan,
through which the federal government paid interest payments for students
while they were enrolled in college. The 1972 reauthorization also initiated
the State Student Incentive Grant Program, offering matching funds to
state governments to encourage locally-meaningful, need-based aid pro-
grams. Within three years all fifty states actively participated in this pro-
gram (Archibald, 2002).
Though the pattern for the federal, state, and institutional lending
relationship was relatively set by 1972, later reauthorizations did offer
equally important changes. The Higher Education Act has faced reauthori-
zation in 1968, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008, with its
latest reauthorization expiring in 2013 and expected to be reauthorized in
2015 (American Association of  State Colleges and Universities State
Relations and Policy Analysis Team, 2014). However, scholars have gener-
ally acknowledged that the 1972 reauthorization cemented the “basic
charter of  today’s federal student aid system” (Gladieux & Hauptman,
1995, p. 16), with students as the intermediaries of  funds between the
federal government and institutions.
The 1980 reauthorization saw the proposal of  a new form of  federal aid
as a part of  the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants Program. Unlike
federal lending programs, this student-based grant program, ultimately
named after Senator Claiborne Pell, did not require repayment and was a
substantial investment in the educational futures of  low- and middle-
income students. In 1980, Pell Grant recipients had to have total family
income of  less than $25,000 annually, and nearly 2.7 million students took
advantage of  this need-based grant program (Gladieux & Hauptman,
1995).
By 1980, institutions and students had a variety of  choices in federal
financial aid. In 1988, Congress renamed the Federal Guaranteed Student
Loan program, which had grown to the largest loan program offered by
the federal government, to honor Vermont Senator Robert Stafford. The
Stafford Loan Program has been the major federal lending program almost
since its inception. In 1989, just one year after its re-designation as the
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Stafford Loan Program, 26.8% of  federal loans offered by the federal
government were Stafford Loans (Wei & Skomsvold, 2010). Moreover, the
prevalence of  Stafford Loans as a portion of  federal lending has steadily
grown throughout the program’s existence. In 1989-1990 the Stafford
Loan Program accounted for 26.8% of  all federal loans. By 2007-2008, the
percentage jumped to 45.5% (Wei & Skomsvold, 2010). This growth was
driven by rising costs in tuition and fees throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Moreover, Wei & Skomsvold (2010) note a striking and historically persis-
tent characteristic of  the Stafford Loan program: A tendency for students
to take out loans at the maximum allowable amount. In any given year,
about sixty percent of  students taking out Stafford Loans take out the
maximum amount they can (Wei & Skomsvold, 2010).
The Pell Grant and Stafford Loan programs solidified the federal
government’s role in aid to students, ensuring access to higher education,
establishing expectations for institutional quality, and solidifying a loan-
based approach to federal aid. However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s,
politicians and their constituents began questioning why federal resources
were not supporting the education of  middle- and upper-class students
(Zumeta, 2001). The Middle-Income Assistance Act of  1978 widened the
availability of  Pell Grant and Stafford Loan program eligibility to more
middle class families (U.S. Congress, 1978). However, a gap between
student aid for the middle class and college affordability was widening as
the cost of  tuition began a decade-long period of  triple digit percentage
increases (Zumeta, 2001). As the 1980s began, Ronald Reagan promised to
reduce college costs and financial aid policies would be the tools for
achieving this goal.
President Regan’s Secretary of  Education, William J. Bennett, was perhaps
the most vocal opponent of  college spending and argued that colleges and
universities were—and had been for some time—increasing tuition simply
because federal student aid was readily available. Much like Truman’s
Commission Report, which highlighted profiteering in higher education in
the 1950s, Bennett (1986, 1987) argued that higher education institutions
hiked tuition costs by 6-to-8 percent each year for nearly a decade simply
because financial aid was available for the taking. Bennett further decried
institutional leaders who asserted that tuition costs were a result of  reduc-
tions in state support of  higher education. Naming specific, high-profile
presidents, Bennett questioned the data campus presidents had access to,
calling such claims of  failing state support fallacies, myth, and lies
(Bennett, 1987).
Nonetheless, Bennett’s arguments and rhetoric struck a nerve with many
political leaders, media outlets, and general citizens in the 1980s and 1990s
and fueled a growing societal distrust of  higher education costs (Zumeta,
2001). Academic, political, and popular press outlets pushed Bennett’s
argument and the notion that more federal aid led to increased tuition
costs has since been referred to as the Bennett Hypothesis. Since the 1980s,
educational researchers have sought to confirm or refute the Bennett
Hypothesis. Researchers have either found no relationship between
increasing federal support and increasing college tuition (Hoxby, 2004;
The Bennett
Hypothesis
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Singell & Stone, 2003), a delayed relationship between increased federal aid
and increased tuition (Smart, 2007), an immediate positive correlation
between federal aid and increasing tuition (McPherson & Schapiro, 1991),
or, in some instances, a direct, negative correlation between federal aid and
rising tuition costs (Singell & Stone, 2003). Zumeta (2001) offers a clear
synopsis on the matter, claiming that the Bennett Hypothesis does hold
some valid logic when viewed through traditional microeconomic theories,
though the scholarly literature and empirical evidence is divided on the
matter.
As the 1980s ended, much of  the populist political rhetoric tarnishing
big government had abated (Zumeta, 2001). In the wake of  Reagan’s call
for smaller, leaner, more fiscally conservative government, many social
welfare and mental health programs were severely limited or cut altogether.
However, many New Deal-era programs—in particular, the G.I. Bill—were
preserved, despite the calls for small government. Though student financial
aid was cut under Reagan, it was not cut as harshly as other programs or as
promised during the 1980 campaign (Roemer, 1985). Reagan’s 1982 and
1986 fiscal budget proposals both called for budget reductions of  $2.3
billion of  funds available for federal student lending programs (Roemer,
1985). However, Reagan’s 1980 promise to completely abolish the Depart-
ment of  Education was not realized and federal student aid programs—
especially the Stafford and Perkins Loan Programs—enjoyed marginal but
stable growth in terms of  the number of  students receiving aid and dollars
appropriated throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Zumeta, 2001).
Nonetheless, the Bennett Hypothesis remains a popular idea—especially in
legislative and popular media circles—despite a lack of  evidence support-
ing it (Hoxby, 2004), furthering the idea that government agendas have
surpassed student merit or needs as important in financial aid policy.
The slow growth of  federal student aid during the Reagan administration
was erased by unprecedented growth in lending during the 1990s. The
1990s were unique in that they began with the Presidency of  Republican
George H.W. Bush, ended with the Presidency of  Democrat Bill Clinton,
and were typified by periods of  House and Senate majority opposition to
the President (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995).
With each change in political philosophy, political parties fashioned federal
student aid programs based upon their political agendas. In 1993, Congress
and President George H.W. Bush increased a variety of  federal loan
programs’ borrowing limits and implemented unsubsidized loans for
students with no demonstrated financial need. By 1990, an estimated 17%
more students had borrowed the maximum amount of  their loan com-
pared to 1980 (Wei & Skomsvold, 2010, p. 6). Thus, while enrollments did
increase into and throughout the 1990s (Synder, 1993), students were
borrowing the maximum allowable amount to finance their wider participa-
tion in vocational, technical, traditional, and professional education (Wei &
Skomsvold, 2010, p. 6). While only 43% of  students borrowed the maxi-
mum amount allowed under the Stafford Loan program in 1990, 51% of
students borrowed the maximum amount in 1998 (Wei & Skomsvold,
2010, p. 6). This increase in both the maximum allowable loan limits and
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college loans in the 1990s, the highest of  any decade since data began
being recorded (Austin, 2012; Gross, Cekic, & Hillman, 2009; Roots, 2000).
George H. W. Bush’s Presidency was also characterized by a series of
economic and federal spending policy changes that had secondary effects
on student lending and grant programs. Chief  among these were efforts to
reduce student loan default rates and redirect an increasingly complex and
out-of-control system of  federal loans, two societal concerns of  the time
(Zumeta, 2001). First, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1990
redesigned how federal loans (including federally guaranteed student loans)
were accounted and required a more clearly measured “cost” for the
federal subsidy of  higher education. This provided new data and perspec-
tives for political discourse and policies in Washington, D.C. Immediately,
Congressional leaders recognized that the federal system of  guaranteeing
loans made by private lenders to students—rather than directly lending
money to students—was costly and burdensome. With the 1992 reauthori-
zation of  the Higher Education Act, Congress and President Bush estab-
lished a pilot program of  direct lending to students. Congress set its sights
on a conversion of  the federal government’s guaranteed loans to direct
lending programs. Ultimately, President Bush did not win reelection and
this conversion was left to his successor, President Bill Clinton.
President Clinton aggressively pursued a complete overhaul of  the
federal financial aid system early in his first term. However, the process
was overwhelming and new phases of  the program intended to pursue
long-range reform were lost to downsizing when the Republican Party
took control of  Congress during the midterm election of  1994 (Fiorina &
Abrams, 2008). In 1993, the newly-elected President signed the Student
Loan Reform Act of  1993, establishing a target for the conversion of  60%
of  federally guaranteed student loans to direct loans across the next five
years. The Act also amended the Higher Education Act to ease the loan
repayment process and reduce paperwork for students. Though some have
called the conversion to a direct lending program Clinton’s greatest success,
the Clinton administration was also able to reduce the interest rates on
student loans and, in 1997, enact tax credits for college expenses (Wei &
Skomsvold, 2010), equally impressive accomplishments.
The years following the enactment of  most federal student loan changes
are characterized by increased participation in loan programs (Wei &
Skomsvold, 2010, p. 6). The Clinton era laws were not unique in this
regard. They were, however, unique in the sheer number of  students who
took out loans directly from the federal government. Student and parent
borrowing jumped by almost $10 billion between 1993 and 1995—nearly a
two-thirds increase in the dollars available for federal lending in just two
years (Gladieux & Hauptman, 1995).
While the 1990s would seem to be the decade of  loan expansion, there
were also significant developments in college savings plans. For a consider-
able period of  time prior to the 1990s, financial institutions and banks had
been offering long-term savings and investment products aimed at helping
families pay for growing costs of  college. In 1996, section 529 of  the
Internal Revenue Code of  1986 was authored to exempt qualified tuition
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programs and college savings plans from taxation (Internal Revenue
Service, 2011). State and private programs were partnering with the federal
government, which offered tax abatements for programs that promoted
saving for college. The implied message of  offering tax abatements for
savings at a time when loan programs were growing exponentially seems
duplicitous. The result, however, was profound. Prior to 1996, one state
(Michigan) had a tuition savings plan, and even it was questioned as a tax-
exempt entity in the judicial system. Between 1996 and 2000, thirty states
developed college tuition savings plans (Dynarski, 2004). Today all fifty
states have partnered with the federal government to offer college savings
plans. These plans eventually came to be known by the section of  the tax
code which afforded them tax-exempt status: 529 College Savings Plans.
The 1990s were a watershed moment in the history of  financial aid not
only because of  the precipitous increase in the number of  students taking
federal student aid but also because of the increasingly complex federal
role in regulating and expanding financial aid and the increased need to
save for college years in advance.
Influences of  the political and economic atmosphere of  the past decade
have been reviewed by scholars such as Eaton (2010), Hoxby (2004),
Singell and Stone (2003), and Smart (2007). The federal government
continued its tinkering or tuning approach with financial aid through
reauthorizations of  the Higher Education Act. The Higher Education Act
was reauthorized in 2008, under the name The Higher Education Oppor-
tunity Act of  2008, and reinforced the government’s and society’s discon-
tent with increasing college costs. The Act directed the Department of
Education to report the top five percent of  institutions with the highest
tuition and fees and the highest net cost, and required institutions with the
highest increase in costs to report on how their leaders plan to cut costs.
To address the political agenda of  limiting college costs and increasing
transparency, the 2008 reauthorization implemented institutional require-
ments for a net-price calculator, simplified lending and loan consolidation
practices, introduced new loan repayment and forgiveness opportunities,
and coordinated efforts of  the Federal Family Educational Loan Program
and the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of  2008. [For an
explanation of  the impact of  the Higher Education Opportunity Act of
2008 on financial aid, see the Council for Higher Education Accreditation
(2008) or Eaton (2010)]. Despite an increasingly complex and detailed
legislative history, the pattern of  increased lending and maximum loan
awards remained constant following the 2008 reauthorization. Response to
the 2008 legislation—and to the economic recession of  2008-2009—was
an increase in both the number of  students on federal aid and the average
loan amount taken out (Wei & Skomsvold, 2010; Zumeta, 2001).
The desire to leave a mark on higher education and student aid was not
exclusive to legislators. In September 2005, U.S. Department of  Education
Secretary Margaret Spellings announced the creation of  The Commission
on the Future of  Higher Education. Secretary Spellings cited challenges
she had in finding information on tuition and costs for her daughter’s
upcoming college attendance to a private liberal arts college (Spellings,
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eleven months interviewing legislators, constituency groups, and a select
group of  elite college presidents before authoring a report that outlined
five areas for improvement in higher education. The value of  higher
education, affordability, access, accountability, and financial aid were the
primary areas the Spellings Commission targeted for further reform (The
Commission on the Future of  Higher Education, 2006). Ruben, Lewis, &
Sandmeyer (2008) contended the recommendations in affordability, access,
and financial aid had the most lasting effects on higher education because
they provided a foundation for the principals underlying current higher
education policy discourse. Ruben, Lewis, & Sandmeyer (2008) and
Lederman (2007) argue that the Spellings Commission was an attempt to
change the political agenda—and less successfully, the actions—of  higher
education in America. In contrast, Robert Zemsky (2011), himself  a
member of  the Commission, opined that the Spelling Commission was “a
grand adventure that ended with little more than a whimper” (para. 1).
Ultimately, time will tell if  the Spellings Commission will serve as a pattern
for priorities in higher education.
George W. Bush-era financial aid policies also were marked by two
programs that, though short-lived, further underscored governmental
focus on national security and economic competitiveness agendas. In 2006,
the U.S. Department of  Education began offering Academic Competitive-
ness Grants (ACG) and the National Science and Mathematics Access to
Retain Talent (SMART) Grant Programs. These programs were designed
to meet the nation’s need for improved math and science instruction. The
Academic Competitiveness Grant program was targeted at Pell Grant
eligible students in their first and second year of  college who completed
challenging courses in high school. In comparison, the SMART Grant
program was targeted at Pell-eligible students who took challenging
courses in high school and who were in their third and fourth year of
college and pursued majors in science, technology, engineering, mathemat-
ics, and specific foreign languages. The SMART Grant program again
opened the door to a major-based focus on federal aid first used in the
loans made to pre-service teachers through the National Defense Educa-
tion Act of  1958. The SMART Grant program’s focus was on supporting
students entering into majors that would hone America’s competitiveness
in a global economy. Though this renewed academic major-focused
approach to federal grants was short-lived, it did represent a contemporary
attempt by the federal government to influence the political agenda of
national economic viability through financial aid policy. In June 2011, the
U.S. Department of  Education discontinued the ACG and the SMART
Grant programs (U.S. Department of  Education, 2013a). Nonetheless, the
notion that federal aid programs should address employment needs in
specific majors had been renewed and may continue to dominate future
political discourses in higher education.
Loan repayment programs were not created in the new millennium. States
had offered programs whereby veterans or professionals working for a
certain number of  years in public service fields could have a certain
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Access Act of  2007 reflected this sentiment by establishing a public service
loan forgiveness program that discontinued any remaining debt after ten
years of  full-time employment in public service positions such as educa-
tion, emergency personnel and law enforcement services, military service,
and government positions (U.S. Department of  Education, 2013b). Such
efforts are reflections of  the NDEA and governmental efforts to shape
the educated citizenry to respond to political priorities.
However, contemporary discourses on loan forgiveness have evolved to
be less focused on qualified repayment through professional service and
more akin to an entitlement program expected for all students (Toby,
2010). In 2012, the New York Times and other media outlets reported that
student loan debt had surpassed the one trillion dollar mark and began
speaking of  higher education as a new sub-prime lending market or “the
next bubble” (Schlesinger, 2012). These notions were fed by fears of
another discourse unique to the 21st Century: predatory lending in higher
education. Rapid growth in for-profit education and questionable recruit-
ment and lending practices in that sector were the subject of  intense
congressional scrutiny in 2010 (Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions, 2012). Sen. Tom Harkin of  Iowa led a Senate Sub-Commit-
tee investigating allegations of  predatory lending and tuition which in-
creased dramatically as students neared completion of  their degree. The
Committee’s report found that admissions officers at specific for-profit
institutions had promised potential students employment, licensure, and
other returns on investment in exchange for relatively high costs of
attendance. The report also notes for-profit institutions gladly took federal
student aid dollars and devoted a disproportionate share of  their budgets
to advertising and recruitment. Criticism has also focused on practices that
targeted low-income, underprepared high school graduates or GED
recipients in an effort to capitalize on federal aid targeted at these special
populations.
These discourses and the U.S. housing market collapse of  2008-2009
fueled concerns that higher education was leading the country toward
another recession, or at least not contributing to economic recovery
(Schlesinger, 2012). Politicians were intent on avoiding the economic
calamities of  the housing collapse. Moreover, the established precedence
of  two major stimulus packages had many students wondering when they
would receive their “bailout” for student loans they had accrued during a
period when the value of  higher education was under intense scrutiny
while the cost was high (Adamson, 2009). With the growth of  student loan
debt past one trillion dollars, policy makers began arguing that this level of
debt had saddled young Americans with unrealistic levels of  debt or had
shifted the nation’s sub-prime loan problems from one industry [housing]
to another [higher education] (Austin, 2012; Schlesinger, 2012). These
discourses have had deep and immediate impacts on student lending and
bolstered enthusiasm for a “student loan bailout” and across-the-board
loan forgiveness programs.
Sensing growing concerns, Michigan Representative Hansen Clarke
sponsored the Student Loan Forgiveness Act of  2012 (H.B. 4170). The Act
introduced a loan program known as the “10/10 forgiveness plan,”
National Association of  Student Financial Aid Administrators 61
wherein a loan holder who had made 120 payments in the first ten years of
their loan would be forgiven the rest of  their loan through cancellation or
federal backing of  the remainder. Under the Act, loan forgiveness would
not be affected by student need, merit, or profession. The proposed act
also took strides to cap federal student loan interest rates, and offer
borrowers new avenues for refinancing student loans. However, the Act
has not gained bipartisan support as Republicans in the House oppose the
Democratically-introduced bill. Opposition to the bill noted the difficulty
of  any student to make all 120 scheduled payments on their loan, further
citing that in 2012, 9.1% of students with federal loan debt defaulted on
their loans within two years (U.S. Department of  Education, 2012; Wei &
Skomsvold, 2010). Opponents also note the likelihood that forgiving loans
without stifling the availability of  future federal lending would only allow
students to further rack up debt. The Student Loan Forgiveness Act of
2012 has been under review with the House Committee on Higher Educa-
tion and Workforce Training since March 2012. However, no additional
action is expected as the Bill’s sponsor, Clarke, faced re-districting, lost re-
election in his primary election, and left Congress in January 2013. Still, the
ideals of  loan forgiveness enjoy widespread support from college students
and in social and political media and will likely be a mainstay in political
discourse for years to come. The fact that loan forgiveness is being consid-
ered devoid of  student need or merit, signal a departure from prior
discourses in financial aid and suggests that loan forgiveness has become a
political agenda of  considerable clout.
As Adamson (2009) argued, “Of  all the transformations that have taken
place in the American university…, perhaps the most radical is the shift
toward financing higher education through borrowed money” (p. 97). The
aforementioned historical episodes demonstrate how aid to students
shifted from local, philanthropic efforts, to a complex federal system of
oversight that is as much a reflection on societal and political realities as it
is student need. In its present form, the federal approach to student
financial aid is “an amalgam of  state programs, federal programs and tax
credits, practices of  private institutions, and programs of  some private
foundations and charities” (Archibald, 2002, p. 46). One consequence of
this complex structure is “a bewildering maze of  programs and options
that, due to…inefficiencies, is predisposed to under-perform in meeting
students’ needs” (p. 46). For most citizens outside the echelons of  higher
education, this situation begs for reform.
Higher education and societal leaders have been engaged in an argumen-
tative pattern about the types of  reforms necessary for student aid pro-
grams since the earliest days of  concerted aid programs. These arguments
have focused on the appropriateness of  student need and merit in the
aiding students. As the history of  financial aid evolved to be increasingly
driven by the federal government, so did the philosophy of  using financial
aid to respond to specific political agendas, such as national security and
economic viability. Prior to the enactment of  the G.I. Bill, financial aid was
primarily a local matter supported through philanthropy and an occasional
institutionally-generated loan program aimed at supporting student needs
and later, student merit. Contemporary higher education leaders face
Conclusion
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politically-motivated challenges to demonstrate the return on massive
federal investments in higher education since the passing of  the G.I. Bill in
1944 while also having to contend with the pragmatic and symbolic
ramifications of  decreasing state support of  higher education. Prior to the
Second World War, students were primarily responsible for charting and
paying for their own future. Contemporary contexts are such that most
students are primarily responsible for securing federal aid prior to pursuing
education and that financial aid policy is directly influenced by political
agendas and legislative priorities. In light of  such massive federal involve-
ment in student lending, higher education leaders are now faced with new
challenges in describing nuanced, innovative, and tangible benefits of
earning a college degree.
Across the history of  financial aid, one sees an evolution away from
local, citizen-initiated philanthropy, to moderate government control and
coordination, and, finally, to full federal oversight and financing of  a
massive and complex system of  financial aid. Paralleling this shift is an
evolution in the philosophy of  aiding students based upon their need, their
merit, and ultimately the political agendas of  the day. This system has
indeed opened the campus gates to millions of  Americans. The tradeoff
of this access has been increased student debt, increased competition for
jobs, and an entrenched sense of  entitlement to financial aid. As a result,
the current system of  higher education has become a complex system
seeking to provide for the needs of  all students and politicians; a task that
would seem foreign and impossible to college students, their parents, and
social leaders of  a few generations ago. This evolution has also made
financial aid policies susceptible to political and societal shifts and has
made for an unstable reality and ever-growing malaise of  seemingly spur
of  the moment policy changes. Institutions have seen the erosion of  their
autonomy and public faith. Simultaneously, institutions face a quandary
about how to finance quality education and remain competitive in such a
complex and increasingly expensive world. The evolution of  financial aid
from a local philanthropic system that services student needs to a federal
system serving political agendas is a story of  students, parents, citizens,
lawmakers, and higher education leaders responding to societal, political,
and personal contexts. Financial aid will continue to be driven by these
contexts and will be a defining factor of future higher education dis-
courses. Developments in financial aid will not only influence patterns in
debt and enrollment, but will also influence institutional quality, leadership,
organizational structure, physical environment, and many social economic
phenomena. Those involved in financial aid will continue to face ever-
changing programs and complex political realities as they strive to support
students in their pursuit of higher education.
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Nexus: Connecting Research to Practice
 Financial aid in the US owes its beginnings to European models,
with local and philanthropic roots. Yet, in the United States
financial aid evolved from local citizen-led charity, to moderate
government oversight, to strong federal oversight. For practitio-
ners this historical context helps explain the sometimes compet-
ing purposes of  financial aid as well as the complex interplay of
local, institutional, state, and federal programs.
 Military pensions would influence latter developments in financ-
ing civilian students’ education. Moreover, the forms of  account-
ability and bureaucracy associated with financing soldiers’
education was a pattern for civilian students’ aid programs as
well. For practitioners this means that the historical evolution of
financial aid has been about opening educational doors for
targeted groups (e.g., veterans, People of  Color, women).
 The historical development of  a federal financial aid system
helped open the doors of  higher education for many, but also
required significant bureaucracy. Practitioners navigate federal
financial aid laws every day, but should remain cognizant of  the
trade off.
Endnote
1 The Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of  1952 §3695 Pub. L. 550.
38 U.S.C. §3695.
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